Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule: The Kentucky Experience by Weintraub, Russell J.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 61 | Issue 2 Article 4
1972
Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule:
The Kentucky Experience
Russell J. Weintraub
University of Texas
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weintraub, Russell J. (1972) "Finding a Substitute for the Place-of-Wrong Rule: The Kentucky Experience," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol.
61 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol61/iss2/4
Finding a Substitute for the
Place-of-Wrong Rule:
The Kentucky Experience
By RussEus J. WEiNTRAUB *
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has abandoned the sterile
logic and illusory certainty' of the place-of-wrong rule and is now
embarked on a search for new solutions to torts-conflicts problems.
The Court's action epitomizes the genius of the common law-the
ability to shape and reshape doctrine, case by case, in step with
the inexorable forces of change generated by current social
realities.
If there is one thing that the Court does not need or deserve
it is carping and impatient criticism of its efforts to date. The
academic specialist has the privilege of studying a particular legal
problem over the span of his career. The judge, however, must
move quickly from one area of the law to another. If the specialist
can clearly and briefly make the fruits of his thinking available
to the judge, the specialist can render a useful service. It is in this
spirit of service that this symposium and this article is offered.
I shall first provide a background for my discussion of the
Court's work by suggesting an approach to tort choice-of-law
problems. Then I shall comment on the three recent conflicts
cases2 decided by the Court.
I. AN APPROACH TO TORT CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEMS.
The Court should first focus on the content of the domestic
laws in putative conflict and on the purposes or policies under-
lying these laws. These policies should be sought with the same
* Marrs McLean Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
'The certainty of the rule was illusory because courts were increasingly
substituting other characterizations for the "tort" label in order to reach results
that could be explained only by largely unarticulated bases for the decisions. See,
e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) ("procedure," "ad-
ministration of estates"); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) ("procedural," "public policy"); Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814 (Wis. 1959) ("family law").2 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Arnett v. Thompson, 433
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
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realistic lawyer-like care with which the Court would seek the
purposes of a rule in a purely domestic case. Possible sources of
information concerning policies include legislative history of
statutes, statements by courts of the relevant state when applying
the rule, statements by courts of other states concerning identical
or similar rules, and statements by expert commentators discus-
sing the rule. In this manner, the Court should be able to identify
with substantial confidence one or more purposes underlying
each of the domestic rules in issue.
Under no circumstances should the Court invent or imagine
a policy that has no basis in anything said about the rule by the
courts of the relevant state or by anyone else. This is what hap-
pened in Dym v. Gordon when the New York Court of Appeals
said that one policy underlying a guest statute was to preserve
the host's assets for the claims of plaintiffs who were not guests.
The physical contacts between a state and the parties or the
occurrence should then be evaluated solely in terms of the pur-
poses of the rules in issue. In the light of a state's nexus with
the case, would its policies be substantially and realistically, not
officiously or hypothetically, advanced by applying its rule in
adjudication? If two states have different rules covering the same
issue, there is probably much that could be said in favor of the
value and wisdom of either rule. Each rule is the product of
weighing and balancing competing social values. It is not likely
that any court or legislature would reach a completely irrational
conclusion in this process of rule making. No state, however,
should wish to impose its conclusion on another when the social
impact of choosing rightly or wrongly will, so far as current nexus
with the problem indicates, be felt solely in the other state.
At this point, many conflicts problems will be solved. Only
one state's policies will seem to have any legitimate claim to
application. There will be many cases, however, in which this is
not so-in which the decision is likely to have substantial social
consequences in each of two or more states. When this is so, the
Court should employ neutral and objective bases for choosing
between the competing rules. The Court should not base its
decision on which state has the most physical contacts. A single
3 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
[Vol. 61
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PLACE-OF-WRONG RuLE
contact with the problem may make a state's policy highly rele-
vant. There is no reason to assume that a state's policy is more
legitimately or more strongly involved because it has more phy-
sical contacts related to its policy than does another state nor,
once it is clear that at least two states have relevant policies,
should the Court attempt to decide which state has the "greater
interest." Such a conclusion is an attempt to quantify an abstrac-
tion. If it has any cogency, it is because of other bases that justify
the decision. The following neutral principles are suggested for
choosing between the relevant tort rules of two or more states.
The Court should start with a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the rule that will permit or increase recovery. This is not
because the Court is or should be biased in favor of plaintiffs. It
is because the trend of development in the law of torts in every
state has been toward recovery, toward distribution rather than
concentration of the loss through the liability-insurance device.
Choosing between the laws of two states on this basis will utilize
a trend widely and generally shared by the two states although
the states differ in the content of two specific and narrow tort
rules. This presumption in favor of liability will then be strength-
ened or rebutted to the extent that, by the objective evidence of
statutory and case developments, the number of states using one
of the competing rules can be seen to be growing and the number
utilizing the other rule to be diminishing. Again the focus is on
objectively discernible shared trends rather than on a subjective
or parochial evaluation of the competing rules. Another factor
that will serve to rebut the presumption of liability is reliance
by the defendant or his insurer on a rule favoring the defendant.
If the effect of these trend and surprise factors is not clear, the
presumption in favor of liability is not rebutted and should pre-
vail.
The approach outlined above is a case method based upon
analysis of the particular law-fact pattern before the Court, rather
than a rules approach. A rules approach, like the place-of-wrong
rule, is based on stating a priori that certain specific physical con-
tacts with a state will determine the applicable law. There is no
reason, however, why a case approach need be ad hoe, or lawless,
or unpredictable. Predictability will emerge from the evolving
pattern of adjudications and from the clear and candid articula-
1973]
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tion of the bases for those adjudications.4 There is, in fact, reason
to believe that the predictability of such a system of adjudication
will be greater than one based on apparently simple and rigid
rules, which the Court must constantly manipulate to avoid unjust
and irrational decisions.
II. WESSLING v. PA'is 5
The approach to tort choice-of-law problems here suggested
would produce the same result as that reached by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals: application of the Kentucky negligence rule
rather than the Indiana guest statute's "wanton or wilful miscon-
duct"0 rule, to determine the liability of the Kentucky host to the
Kentucky guest for injuries resulting from the automobile accident
in Indiana.
The Indiana cases do not contain extensive discussions of the
policies underlying the Indiana guest statute. Insofar as policy
analysis appears, it focuses on the desirability of shielding the
host from the claims of his ungrateful guest.7 If this is the sole
purpose of the Indiana statute, then Kentucky and Indiana have
come to different conclusions concerning the relative importance
of compensating the injured guest and protecting the host from
litigious guests. If Kentucky law is applied and Kentucky is
wrong in its conclusion, a Kentucky host will feel the sting of
ingratitude. If the Indiana statute is applied and Indiana is
wrong, a Kentucky guest will go uncompensated. Kentucky has
as much and Indiana has as little legitimate concern with applying
their solutions to this interstate problem as they would to a
problem having only Kentucky contacts.
A Note in the Indiana Law Journal suggests another purpose
behind the Indiana guest statute-protecting the host's liability
insurer from collusion between host and guest.8 This anti-collusion
4 See Sedler, Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-
Centered Conflict of Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27 (1967).
5417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).6 IND. ANN. STAT. § 47.1021 (1965).
7 See, e.g., Blair v. May, 19 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. App. Ct. 1939); Con-
conower v. Stoddard, 182 N.E. 466, 470 (Ind. App. Ct. 1932). These cases con-
cerned an earlier version of the Indiana guest statute. But see Note, The Indiana
Guest Statute, 34 IND. L.J. 338, 344 (1959) ("There is no appreciable difference in
the factors which have been considered important in assessing liability of an auto-
mobile host under the two acts.").
8 Note, The Indiana Guest Statute, 34 IND. L.J. 338, 340 (1959).
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policy is frequently mentioned in scholarly discussions of guest
statutes. Protecting the liability insurer from collusion will keep
down insurance rates. Any cost to Mr. Paris' insurer within the
minimum requirements of the Kentucky financial responsibility
law,10 however, will be charged to the loss experience of the Ken-
tucky rating district in which Mr. Paris' car is principally garaged
and will affect the cost of basic insurance only in that district.
Costs to the insurer exceeding these limits will go into a nation-
wide data pool and affect rates on insurance above the basic
limits in all states, including Indiana, but no more than would
recovery for a Kentucky accident involving only Kentucky par-
ties." Thus, insofar as an Indiana anti-collusion policy is designed
to keep down liability insurance rates, Indiana can have no more
concern in imposing its view here than it would in a case com-
pletely devoid of Indiana contacts. If Indiana fears the effect
of host-guest collusion on the moral fiber of society or on the
integrity of the judicial process, it is Kentucky that will feel the
primary impact of the evil if Indiana is right, and experience the
benefits of preferring compensation for the victim if Indiana is
wrong. Application of the Kentucky ordinary negligence standard
is the solution consistent with an evaluation of the legitimate
reach of the policies underlying the Indiana and Kentucky rules.
III. AmRN v. THOmPSON12
If the "Ohio" couple, the Arnetts, were what the Court's
description, "residents of Ohio,"13 connotes, application of the
conflicts method outlined in section I would have produced a
result opposite that reached by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The Ohio guest statute and interspousal immunity rule would
have been applied to preclude recovery by the Ohio guest-wife
from her Ohio host-husband for the injuries she suffered as the
D See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 16.15 (1956); W.
PROSSER, HANooK or TnE LAW OF TORTS 187 (4th ed. 1971).
10 Ky. REv. STAT. § 187.330(3) (1971) ($10,000 personal injury per person;
$20,000 personal injury per accident; $5,000 property damage).
IJ See McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 INSURANCE COUN-
sE J. 398, 401, 403-06 (1968); Stem, Rate-making Procedures for Automobile
Liability Insurance, 52 PnocFncs CAsuA.rY AcruARAL Soc'Y 139, 155, 176-77,
183 (1965).
12 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
13 Id. at 112.
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result of the collision. 4 Investigation, however, has revealed
facts only hinted at in the opening sentence of the opinion: "Carl
A. Arnett and Edna his wife, residents of Ohio, while visiting
relatives in Kentucky .... "' The Arnetts were native Kentuckians
who were residing in Ohio for the time being because Mr. Arnett
could find suitable employment there but not in Kentucky. They
thought of themselves as Kentuckians, hoped to return to live
in Kentucky as soon as employment conditions permitted, and
returned "home" frequently to see relatives and friends. They
remained in Kentucky after the litigation was concluded and are
living there now.'(
The Arnetts' close ties with Kentucky made it extremely likely
that denial of compensation to the wife would have a significant
impact within Kentucky. It was foreseeable that the Arnetts
would soon resume their Kentucky residence. Therefore, if failure
to compensate the wife adversely affected her welfare and the
welfare of her family, these evils would, in all likelihood, be
realized in Kentucky. The Kentucky compensation policy had a
legitimate, not officious, claim to recognition.
The Ohio guest-statute cases, like the Indiana cases, emphasize
the injustice of permitting the guest to sue the host for ordinary
negligence.'7  In applying the interspousal immunity rule, the
Ohio courts cite the dangers of collusion and marital discord.18
Because the Arnetts had such close ties with Kentucky at the
time of the accident and because of the great likelihood that they
would, as they have, soon resume their Kentucky residence, there
is substantial doubt as to the relevance of the Ohio host-protection
and marital-harmony policies. The Arnetts' automobile was, how-
ever, principally garaged in Ohio and therefore the Ohio anti-
collusion policy was legitimately applicable to help keep down
Ohio liability insurance rates.
14 Cf. Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1968) (Iowa guest
statute, not Wisconsin negligence standard, applicable when Iowa guest injured in
Wisconsin by Iowa host; "Wisconsin has no significant relationship with the
parties nor any interest in any issue herein presented."). But cf. Conklin v.
Homer, 157 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1968) (Wisconsin negligence rule rather than
Illinois guest statute applicable when Illinois guests injured in Wisconsin by
Illinois host).
15 433 S.W.2d at 112.
16 Information supplied to Professor Sedler by attorney for Edna Arnett.
17 See, e.g., Duncan v. Hutchinson, 39 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ohio 1942).
Is Lyons v. Lyons, 208 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ohio 1965).
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The clash between the Ohio anti-collusion, the weakened Ohio
host-protection and marital-harmony policies on one side and the
Kentucky compensation policy on the other side was, under the
neutral conflicts principles suggested in section I, properly re-
solved in favor of compensation. There is no clearly discernible
trend toward repealing guest statutes,19 but "[a]n increasing
minority"20 of courts are abandoning interspousal immunity in
automobile accident cases. Moreover, the suggested presumption
in favor of liability is not rebutted by any danger of surprise to
either the husband or his liability insurer. The husband would
not have driven more carefully in Kentucky, nor would he have
purchased more or different liability insurance if he could have
foreseen the application of the Kentucky negligence standard to
determine his liability to his wife-passenger. The insurer is pro-
tected because the cost of defending the wife's suit against her
husband and of paying the judgment will be counted in the loss
experience of the appropriate Ohio rating district and affect
insurance rates in that district. Moreover, this effect on insurance
rates will occur before judgment, at the moment that the insurer's
claims department decides that payment is sufficiently likely to
10 Twenty-six states still have guest statutes: ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 95 (1958);
Arx. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-914, 915 (1957); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 17158 (1971);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (Cum.
Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.59 (1968); IDAHO CODE § 49-1401 (1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-32, § 9-201 (Smith-Hurd 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1021(1966); IOwA CODE ANN. § 321.494 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-122(b) (1964);
MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.401 (1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 32-1113
(1961); NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-740 (1968); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.180 (1971);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-1 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-15-01, 02, 03 (1960);
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4515.02 (Anderson 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.115 (1971;
S.C. CODE § 46-801 (1962). S.D. CoMPrrE LAws ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(b) (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-9-1, 2 (1970);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-646.1 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.08.080 (1972).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 31-233 (1959). Only the Vermont Statute has been repealed
in recent years, VT. LAws 1970, ch. 194. In Massachusetts, the former judicially
created requirement of a showing of more than ordinary negligence for a guest
passenger to recover against his host driver (Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 118 N.E. 168(Mass. 1917)) has recently been changed by statute to an "ordinary negligence"
standard. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 85L (Supp. 1973). A judicial require-
ment of more than ordinary negligence for guest-passenger recovery persists in
Georgia (Hennon v. Hardin, 50 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948)).0 Immer v. Risko 267 A.2d 481, 482 (N.J. 1970) (abolishing interspousal
immunity in automobile accident cases). For other recent decisions abrogating
interspousal immunity, see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376
P.2d 70 (1962); Beaudette v. Frana, 173 N.W.2d 416 (Minn. 1969). But see
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P.2d 389 (Utah 1963) (wife may not sue husband's
estate for injuries suffered in automobile accident, overruling insofar as inconsistent
Taylor v. Patten, 275 P.2d 696 (Utah 1954).
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warrant including the estimated payment in the insurer's "loss
reserves."
21
The wife is also suing the driver of the other automobile,
Mullins. If Mullins had been found liable, Kentucky law would
permit Mullins to obtain contribution from his co-defendant.
22
Application of Ohio law, however, would insulate the host-hus-
band from the co-liability on which contribution must be based.
23
Because Mullins is a Kentucky resident,24 if Mullins had been
found liable to the wife, Kentucky's liability-contribution policies
would be strongly applicable. If Kentucky's contribution rule
were applicable, this would provide an independent justification
for refusing to apply the Ohio guest statute or interspousal
immunity rule.25 In this case, however, Kentucky's contribution
policy is not applicable because the jury has exonerated Mullins.
In a case involving a host-husband and guest-wife who do
not have the close ties with Kentucky that the Arnetts have, the
desirability of applying the Kentucky negligence standard to
determine the host-husband's liability to his guest-wife turns on
whether the driver of the other car is liable to the guest-wife.
Therefore, in such a case, the jury should either be given alterna-
tive instructions concerning the circumstances under which the
host-husband can be found liable, or be instructed to render
special verdicts on the various fact findings that will determine
choice of law.
IV. Fosnm v. LE.GETr 6
The immediately preceding discussion of Arnett v. Thompson
would appear to adumbrate the answer to Foster v. Leggett. In
21 See McNamara, supra note 11, at 401; Stem, supra note 11, at 144-45.
22 Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1971); of. id. § 454.040 (jury may assess joint or
several damages against the defendants).
23 See, e.g., Pire v. Kortebein, 186 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
24 See note 16 supra. Kentucky's liability-contribution policies would also be
applicable if Mullins were not a Kentucky resident but a resident of a state with
liability rules similar to those of Kentucky.
25 See Taylor v. Bullock, 279 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1971); Saleem v. Tamm, 67
Misc.2d 335, 323 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (refuses to "exonerate a co-
defendant involved in an accident from liability by reason of his domicile, and hold
other defendants in under the New York State Law"); Pierce v. Helz, 64 Misc.2d
131, 314 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (law of New York, not that of Florida
domicile, applied to permit son to sue stepfather when other defendants are New
York residents).
26 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972).
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Foster, because the defendant-host is an Ohio citizen, the Ohio
guest statute policies (host-protection and anti-collusion) are
applicable. Because the guest is a Kentucky resident, Kentucky's
compensation policy also has a strong, not hypothetical, claim to
recognition. The neutral bases for conflict resolution suggested in
section I and applied in the discussion of Arnett, would point
toward application of the Kentucky negligence rule.
There is, however, an additional problem in Foster. Does
Kentucky have a sufficient nexus with the defendant or the
defendant's course of conduct to make it fair and reasonable for
Kentucky to assert its interest in compensation under Kentucky
standards for the Kentucky guest?27 For example, suppose that
the Kentucky plaintiff was a pedestrian crossing an Ohio street
when she was struck by an automobile driven by an Ohio resident.
Assume that on one or more issues the Kentucky rules of liability
and compensation are more favorable to the injured pedestrian
than the Ohio rules. Even if the Ohio driver can be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the Kentucky courts, by, for example, being
served with process while temporarily present in Kentucky, Ken-
tucky law should not be applied. Assertion of the Kentucky com-
pensation interest based solely on the residence of the plaintiff
and without any other connection between Kentucky and the
defendant or the occurrence would be chauvinistic. 28 In Foster,
however, there is more than ample nexus between Kentucky, the
defendant, and the defendant's course of conduct, to make it
reasonable and desirable that the conflict between Ohio and
Kentucky law be resolved in favor of applying the Kentucky law.
In guest-statute cases, even when the defendant does not have the
close residential and social contacts with Kentucky that he had
in Foster, Kentucky should be free to assert its compensation
policy in favor of the Kentucky guest whenever the automobile
27 See Sedler, supra note 4, at 128.
28 See Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D. Colo. 1969)
("Tbe only contact that New Mexico has with the injury is the residence of theplaintiff in that state.... [lilt would be nothing short of arbitrary to apply New
Mexico law."). But see Foster v. Maldonado, 315 F. Supp. 1179 (D.C.N.J.), leave
to appeal denied, 433 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1970); Tjepkema v. Kenney, 31 A.D.2d
908, 298 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup. Ct.), motion to appeal dismissed, 24 N.Y.2d 942,
250 N.E.2d 68, 302 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1969); Mackendrick v. Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co., 59 Misc.2d 994, 302 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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trip extends or is planned to extend into Kentucky, no matter
where the collision occurs.29
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky is engaged in an exciting
re-analysis of choice-of-law rules in tort cases. Ahead lie other
conflicts problems, not only in torts, but also in other substantive
fields. The Court will also wish to re-examine which matters
should be considered "procedural" for conflicts purposes and
which "substantive." I wish the Court well in these efforts and
am confident that it will continue to demonstrate the flexible
strength and heightened contemporary relevance of the com-
mon-law case system in the administration of justice.
29 Recent guest statute cases with an indication whether their holdings are
consistent or inconsistent with the nexus standard here suggested: Pryor v. Swarner,
445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971) (no liability, inconsistent)- Bennett v. Macy, 324
F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (liability, consistent); Schneider v. Nichols 158
N.W.2d254 (Minn. 1968) (liability, consistent); Dow v. Larrabee, 217 A.2d 506(N.H. 1966) (no liability, inconsistent); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa.
1970) (no liability, inconsistent).
